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In The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ALEXIS B. MALAN~ 
Deceased. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, 
ELFREDA A. MALAN 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9076 
Respondent agrees generally with the Appellant~"s State-
ment of Facts; however, the deeds referred to therein were 
delivered by the grantor to the grantor~"s son, and were by 
him causd to be recorded. Further, the widowl' not the es· 
tate, c I aimed the exclusion of $12~583. 33 which represents 
one-third of the value of the real property described in the 
deeds. The question on appeal is whether the widow prop-
erly claimed an exclusion of one-third of the value of the 
real property described in deeds for her statutory dower in 
said real property in determining inheritance tax liability 
incident to the death of her husband. Whether said deeds 
were made or not made, in contemplation of death was not 
an issue in the case (R. 5)+ 
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STATE1iENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
TE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMIN-
ING THE INHERITANCE TAX TO BE THE SUM OF 
$702.42~ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMIN-
IN'G THE INHERITANCE TAX TO BE THE SUM 
OF $702.42. 
The point above is the ultimate conclusion Respondent 
seeks this Court to reach. The sinews of the case itself will 
be dealt with by the Respondent in her brief. 
Firstly~ the wife's interest in her husband's real prop-
erty: 
1
'7 4-4-3+ Wife's interest in bus band's real property~­
One-tmrd in value of all the legal or equitable estates 
in real property possessed by the husband at any time 
during the marriage~ to which the wife has made no 
relinquishment of her rightsl' shall be set apart as 
her property in fee simple, if she survives him; * * • 
Property distributed under the provisions of this sec-
tion shall be free from all debts of the decedent ex· 
cept those secured by liens for work or labor done or 
material furnished exclusively for the improvement 
of the same, and except those created for the purchase 
thereof~ and for taxes levied thereon+ * * * ~ J 
(Emphasis added+) 
What then was the effect of the deeds made by decedent, 
his wife not having joined with him? It is thought that the 
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3 
effect is a transfer of all of the husband's right~ title and 
interest in the property conveyed, and not more than this .. 
It is not a conveyance of the wife's statutory interest in the 
property .. 
This court in the case o£ Cardon v Harper et al., 151 Pac. 
2d 99, decided in 1944t in an appeal from a judgment where-
in certain real property of a husband, and the whole thereof l 
was adjudged and decreed to be a part of such husband's 
bankrupt estate and to be administered by the trustee, in 
considering the wife's interest in husband's real property~ 
says respecting such judgment: 
''Taken literally, the deere e as it now stands in 
effect operates to divest the wife of the bankrupt, 
Louise C. Harper, of her contingent one-third interest 
in the land which she acquired by law~ ownership of 
which had nothing whatsoev-er to do with the fraud. 
The decree could properly operate only to rescind the 
transfer of whatever title the husband conveyed to 
his \\life+ Without relinquishment on her part of her 
interest, the trustee in bankruptcy, like the purchaser 
at execution sale, could acquire only the title and 
interest which the husband had the legal righitO 
convey~ 
~'Except as to the family homestead, 10 1-1 ... 1, 
U.C.A., 1943, gives a married man a right to devise 
away without the consent or relinquishment by the 
wife of her interest, two-thirds in value of each parcel 
of real estate, legal or equitable, which he owns. The 
other one-third in value vests in his wife free from 
his debts if she survives him and she has not there-
tofore relinquished her interest. 10 1-4-3~ U.C.A~ 1943. 
See In Re Reynolds"' EstateJ 90 Utah 415~ 62 Pac~ 2d 
270. 
uThe purchaser at execution sale and the pur-
chaser at bankru pte y sale of the rightt title, equity 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
and interest of the husband in bankruptcy can acquire 
no greater rights in the property than the husband 
acting withotit the \Vritten concurrence Of the wife 
could convey. The decree setting aside Harper)s deed 
to his wife as fraudulent should operate so as to 
cancel the deed and leave the title as it was before 
such deed was executed. 
''The decree of the lower court is modified so 
that the operational effect thereof is to cancel said 
deed and bill of sale from Thomas R+ Harper to his 
wife, without disturbing the contingent one-third in-
terest of his wife in the described land." 
(Emphasis added.) 
While the Malan case has no mortgage involvement, 
such as was in the case of In Re Reynolds' Estate:~ Zion's 
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v State Tax Commission~ 62 Pacr 
2d 270~ decided in 1936~ the case, nevertheless~ contains 
language expressing an interpretation of a wife~s interest. 
The Court deciding in that case that the 'Wi.dow~s dower is 
unaffected by mortgages in which she joined with her hus-
band where there was no need because of the solvent con-
dition of the estate to use the dower interest in their satisfac· 
tion; and deciding that it was proper for the one-third in .. 
terest in value of the real property without consideration of 
any mortgage lien to be deducted in reference to inheritance 
tax determination) and on such no liability for inheritance 
taxes accrued. rrhe Court says~ 
'
1The 'Wi.fe~s interest has some of the aspects of 
joint tenancy in one-third of the real estate. In the 
common law joint tenancy~ each owned every bit of 
the whole. One who died simply fell away from the 
title. The husband by predeceasing her does not ef· 
fectuate a passage of title of her one .. third, but only 
recedes frorn the interest she hadt at the same time 
maturing it.~J 
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Next comes the provisions of the inheritance tax law 
which we examine to see whether or not it provides for in-
heritance taxation on a wife~s interest in her husband~s real 
property~ 
Section 59-12-3, Co de Annotated, 19531 pertinently pro-
vides: 
''Gross estate how determined-* * *.-The value 
of the gross estate of a decedent shall be determined 
by including the value at the time of his death, * * $ 
of all property, real or personal~ within the jurisclic .. 
tio n of thls state, and any interest therein~ whether 
tangible or intangible~ which shall pass to any person, 
in trust or otherwise~ by testamentary disposition or 
by law of inheritance or succession of this or any 
other state or county, or by deed~ grant~ bargain, 
sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the 
grantor, vendor or donor~ or intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment at or after his death. * * *. '' 
(Emphasis added.) 
Nowhere in Chapter 12, dealing with inheritance tax~ is 
there a provision for the exc 1 us ion of dower. 
That dower is excludable~ however, has not ever been 
questioned. The point being that the dower interest is not 
considered in the inheritance tax provisions as ever includ-
able in the ascertainment of the gross estate. The custom 
and the practice, however, seem to be to include the dower 
interest in the appraisement of real property and to exclude 
the value of the dower interest on the form and in the man-
ner provided by the State Tax Commission (R. 11). 
It is) therefore, apparent that the dower interest of a 
wife is not property ''which shall pass•' in the intendment 
of the inheritance tax provisions. 
Now to the cases~ excerpts therefrom, and analysis. 
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In the case of In Re Bullen's Estate_! 47 Ut. 96~ 151 Pac. 
533, decided in 1915, the question was, uls the widow~s one-
third interest in her husband~s real property subject to the 
inheritance tax?n The then statutory provision under Camp. 
La\vs~ 1907, paragraph 2826, is substantially similar to the 
provisions of 7 4·4-3, U ~ C.A., 1953, appearing above. The 
then pertinent statutory provisions of Comp. Laws 1907~ 
paragraph 12 20xt is substantially similar to the pertinent 
correlative provisions of 59· 12-3 ~ U. C .A.~ 195 3 ~ appearing 
above. 
The Court then states: 
''What the wife receives under Section 2826--one· 
third in fee simple of all the legal and equitable 
estate in real property possessed by the husband dur-
ing coverture, and not relinquished by her - she 
receives, not as an heir of her husband~ but in her 
own right~ something which belongs to her absolutely, 
and of which she could not have been deprived by 
\Vill Or by any other VOlUntary acto£ her husband 
without her consent. Under that section~ she is not an 
heir within the meaning of our intestate or succes-
sion statutes.,~ 
And the Court further states: 
'~* * * the wife~s interest, under section 2826, does 
not pass by the intestate laws, or, as called in the 
inheritance tax act! statutes of inheritance * ~ *.tj 
And: 
''So beret while under our statute the 'Wife does not 
take as a survivor of community property, sbe never· 
theless takes her one-third interest in the husbandjs 
real estate in fee simple~ just as absolute and as much 
in her own right as does the wife take her one-half 
in community property. In neither instance can she 
be deprived of that right by will~ or by any other 
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voluntary act of her husband without her consent~ 
and in neither is her interest a warded or acquired 
by succession, descent~ or inheritance. Succession, as 
defined by the statute, iis the coming in of another 
to take the property of one who dies without dis-
posing of it by will.~ That implies that property ac-
quired by succession may be disposed of by will. But 
the property which the wife takes under section 2826 
may not be disposed of by will without her consent/~ 
And finally: 
''With that conclusion it follows that the interest 
which the wife takes under section 282 6 is not sub· 
ject to the inheritance tax * + *~u 
(Emphasis added.) 
The concurring opinion of Frick, J. emphasizes that 
"Wif e•s right under section 2 82 6 is con tin gent only upon her 
surviving her husband; is not limited to such real estate 
as the husband dies seized of, but extends to all the legal 
and equitable estate in real property possessed by her hus .. 
band at any time during the marriage and to which the 
wife has made no relinquishment of her right; she takes her 
full interest, although the hush a.itd had fully disposed of 
his interest during his lifetime; and: 
'~When the legislature~ therefore, adopted the statute 
by which a tax upon all property "which shall pass by 
vrill or by the statute of inheritancet was imposed, the 
wife~s interest in the husband's real estate under 
section 2826 was) manifestly, not included in view 
of the terms of the statute~~' 
(Emphasis added.) 
While the Bullen case is one that deals with the question 
of inheritnace taxability of dower interests, and determines 
that such dower interests are not, nor were they ever~ in-
tended to be so taxable; the determination was made in 
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particular consideration of an intestate estate. There may, 
therefore t be considered these matters in the light of estates 
wherein wills were involved. 
The first outstanding will case is In Re Osgood's Estate, 
52 Ut. 188, 17 3 Pac., 152, decided in 1918r The decedenes 
will provided~ in substance, all of his estate to a trustee-
partial benefits therefrom to his wife-and specifically say-
ing ~"provided, however, that this provision for my wife shall 
be in lieu oft and not in addition to~ her statutory dower 
interest in my estate granted by section 2826 of the Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1907 .':~ 
In this case the Court considered paragraphs 2826 and 
1220x Comp. Laws 1907, as was done in the Bullen caset and 
in addition section 2827 dealing with the election by widow 
to take under will or distributive share. This latter section 
is identical with the present law 74-44, U.C.A., 1953. Due 
to its importance in that case~ and to show the nature of 
provisions which are not duplicated in our law with respect 
to deeds} its provisions are herein set forth in full. 
~ '7 4-4-4., Election by widow to take under will or 
distributive share.-If the husband shall make any 
provision by will for the widow, such provision shall 
be deemed to be in lieu of the distributive share 
secured by the next preceding section, unless it shall 
appear from the will that the decedent designed the 
testamentary provisions to be additional to such dis· 
tribu tive share~ If~ however~ it does not appear from 
the \Vi.ll that its provision for the widow is addi tiona!, 
then the \Vidow shall be conclusively presumed to 
have renounced such provision and t.o have accepted 
her distributive share, unless within four months after 
the admission of the will to probateJ or 'Within such 
additional time before distribution as the court may 
allow t she shall, by written instrument filed with the 
clerk of the court~ accept the testamentary pro vi-
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sio n ~ \Vhich acceptance shall be construed to be a 
renunciation of her distributive share. In the event 
that the wife shall be insane or incompetent~ or a b-
sent from the state, an election shall be made for 
her by a general guardian. if she has one, or by a 
special guardian for the purpose appointed by the 
court."" 
{Emphasis added.) 
It appearing in that case that an intentional election, 
in writng, was made for the widow by her guardian to take 
under the will as construed by stipulation) and such being 
in lieu of her statutory right~ the Cow1 says~ ''She of neces· 
sity relinquishes her right to take under section 2826t and 
thus whatever share she receives from her husband's estate 
under the will passes to her by such will and not otherwise.'' 
In consequence"' the estate, including that property which, 
but for her election, she could have received under the 
provisions of section 2826, was subject to inheritance taxes. 
Appellant cites this case as one in the series of cases 
heretofore considered by this Court bearing upon facts and 
conditions giving rise to determinations of taxability in es-
tates on facts appearing, just as in the Bullen case there 
were facts and conditions warranting non-taxa bill ty. The 
cases are not similar, and each is supportable in law and in 
reason on the fact situations in each appearing and the ap· 
p lie able laws, particularly as set out in 7 4-4-4, U. C .A., 1953. 
The second outstanding will case is In Re Kohn~s Estate, 
56 Ut. 17 ~ 189 Pac. 4 09 ~ decided in 1920. Here the court 
determined and so finds "'that the widow not only intended 
to and did waive her right to take under the statute~ but 
elected to and did take under her husband"s will." She 
served as sole executrix and distributed the estate in ac-
cordance with the terms and provisions of the wilL The 
same substantial statutory provisions were considered in 
this case as were considered in the Osgood case, namely 
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Comp. Laws 1917 paragraph 6406 {dower) and 6407 (election 
by widow to take under will or distributive share). Inheri-
tance taxation on all property of the estate resulted. 
The Court further pointed out that in this case: 
"Distribution could not have been made in accord-
ance with the provisions of the will unless the exe-
cutrix elected to take under it and had waived her 
statu tory right., :t 
We now come to the case In Re Kjar~s Estate, 62 Ut 427~ 
220 Pac. 501t decided in 1923. In this case it was taken as 
facts that decedent conveyed by deed substantially all o£ 
his estate shortly prior to death and in contemplation of 
death to his 'vife and children. In the determination of the 
inheritance tax liability the district court permitted the ad-
ministrator, over the objection of the State Tax Commission~ 
the deduction of an amount equal to the "Widow, s one-third 
of the value of the real estate; then the appeal. In the Suw 
pre me Court the validity of the objection presented the only 
question to be determined~' the Supreme Court stating the 
matter as follows; 
"The concrete question to be determined is, was 
the administrator, in the circumstances, authorized by 
law to deduct from the value of the property one-
third of the value of the real estate as and for the 
widow"s third allowed her tinder Comp. Laws Utah 
1917, paragraph 6406? And! especially, it may be 
asked, was the administrator authorized to make such 
deduction, where the 'Widow hersell was making no 
claim on her own account under the statute referred 
to, and where there is nothing,. in the record to inT 
dicate that she did not join in the conveyances or 
that they were made without her consent?~~ 
The Court determines the answer to this conerete 
question: 
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''It is expressly stated in the petition of the admini-
strator that the deeds made by the deceased prior to 
his death were in the nature of a final distribution 
of his estate, and no doubt it \Vas so intended and 
so understood, not only by the deceased~ but by his 
wife and other members of the family. In the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that 
the conveyances were made with the consent of his 
wife, and that she therefore relinquished her right 
to such portions of the property as were not conveyed 
to herself.'' 
The Court distinguished the Bullen case as one where 
husband died leaving real estate to which the wife had not 
relinquished her right. And distinguished the Osgood case 
as a 'Will case, commenting that a person claiming an ex-
emption from the tax was charged with the burden of 
proving the facts entitling him to exemption; and no such 
facts were attempted to be shown. 
The Court does say,. as Appellant set out: 
'~Under the inheritance tax law, conveyance by 
deed stands upon the same footing as conveyance 
by will.~' 
and quotes Comp. Laws Utah 1917 paragraph 3185 as amend-
ed in Sess. Laws 1919 C. 64, the prec eeding law to Section 
59-12-3~ U .C.A., 1953, italicizing therefrom: 
"* • * or by deed * * ~ made in contemplation of the 
death of the grantor * ~ *~' 
Since this same statute at that time had the 'vords "or 
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or 
after death of the grantor/' it is presumed that these words 
would have been italicized had the Court found them more 
apt in relation to the facts found+ In conse que nee, it is as-
sumed that a situation where "in contemplation of death" 
or '~to take effect in possession at or after death'~ would be 
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treated the same. 
The Kjar case was decided with no brief filed by the 
respondent, in other words, without either the widow or the 
admirustrator actively controverting the attempted appeal. 
This is wholly understandable in view of the facts that ap· 
parently the deeds included both the widow and children 
as grantees and from ought that appears, they were in pos-
session of the property prior to the death of the grantor! 
and a claim of dower would be at the expense of children 
named in the deeds. 
Since this is the case Appellant contends is indistinguish .. 
able from the Malan case~ and controlling, it behooves Re .. 
spondent to make the distinguisbment as follows: 
Kjar's 
1. Deed conveyance made 
prior to death of wife and 
children. 
2. Made in contemplation of 
death. 
3.. An apparent inter vivos 
transfer~ 
4. Administrator originally 
seeking tax determina-
tion exclucling dower in· 
terest .. 
5+ Administrator~ as respon-
dent on appealt apparent-
ly unresisting effort of 
Malan~s: 
Deed conveyances made prior 
to death to wife. 
Made to take effect at or af-
ter death~ but whether in con-
templation of death undet~ 
mined. 
Conveyances made by grant~ 
or, delivery by him to son, 
with instructions to record 
after death of grantor. 
The widow originally seeking 
tax determination excluding 
dower interest 
The widow) as respondent on 
appeal~ vigorously resisting 
effort of State Tax Co mmis-
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State Tax Commission to sion to assess tax on dower 
assess tax on ~~Dower t' in- interest 
terest 
6. ~ 'lVidow herself was mak-
ing no claim on her own 
account under the stat-
ute." 
7. (I Nothing in the record to 
indicate that she did not 
join in the conveyances.~' 
Widow herself ts malting 
claim on her own account 
under the statute (R. 2). 
The record shows conclusive-
ly widow did not join in the 
conveyances (R. 7, 8, and 9}. 
WhUe the Court says, '"'in the absence of evidence to 
the contraty1 it must be presumed that the conveyances 
were made with the consent of his wife, and that she there-
fore relinquished her right to such portions of the property 
as were not conveyed to hers elf,~' such in no way says, nor 
inferst that even in the case of consent of his wife~ such con-
stitutes a relinquishment to such portions of the property 
as \vere conveyed to herself .. 
The K jar case presents difficulty in as much as it appears 
that the decision to permit taxation was, in effect~ uncon-
tested~ and no effort was apparently made to infonn the 
Court of those reasons why taxation should not be made. The 
case is not controlling in the Malan case~ the factual situation 
being differentt and the expressed fact premises for the con-
clusion reached in the K jar case being diametrically opposite 
those in the Malan case. 
The deeds of :Mr. Malan to his wife undoubtedly con~ 
veyed to her the title and interest which he had a legal right 
to convey+ He could not give her more. He could not convey 
to his mfe her inchoate dower interest, the law gave her 
thls on Mr. Malan's acquisition of the real property during 
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their coverture .. On Mrr Malan's death that inchoate dower 
interest of Mrs_ Malan ripened and was absolute. 
In this case there is and has been no question that inheri .. 
tance taxes became owed on two-thirds in value of all of Mr. 
Malan's real property~ and on other taxable property, the 
tax being $702.42, and such has been paid. 
It is not reasonable ior the State Tax Commission to 
contend that the inheritance taxes accrued upon the dower 
interest of Mrs. Malan when it is obvious that such interest 
of Mrs .. Malan did not pass to her by deedt but passed to her~ 
or was hers, under the law. 
This does not do violence to the provisions of 59-12-3, 
U~C.A.~ 1953, whereunder the method of determining gross 
estate is set worth. Such requires inclusion of "* * * property t 
real or personal~ * * * which shall pass to any person * * ~ by 
deed * * *'t~ 
A real violence to the laws of this State would be done 
were it possible that a woman's dower interest be taxed 
upon the death of her husband in clear and plain disregard 
of the law provisions 7 4-4-3, U + C~A+~ 1953, and in the light of 
the cases all cited herein recognizing the subsistence of the 
dower statute. The two will ca.s es cited recognize the dower 
statute and find~ and in accord a nee with the provisions of 
that statute, that a relinq uishrnent by the wife was made; 
in one by the wife's guardian, the other by herself in admin-
istering and in distributing in accordance with the will. The 
Kja.r case is obviously a case not applicable or comparable 
factually to the Malan case, and decided, it appears~ without 
contest, and certainly without due consideration being made 
of the provisions of our dower statute,. the gross estate stat· 
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ute, nor the statutes of fraud. The Will cases and the deter-
minations made therein are aided, or per haps it would be 
more accurate to say are controlled, by the special statute 
dealing with election by widow to take under will or distrib-
utive share~ but there is no correlative statute requiring that 
a \Vife taking under a deed~such legal rightt title and in-
terest as a husband can convey by such process-must sur-
render, and give up, and it must be interpreted as a relin-
quishment by her of her statutory dower interest. Absent 
such a statute there seems no legalJ equitable or statutory 
reason for depriving a widow of her dower rights and of all 
the emoluments thereof. There is no reason why the receipt 
of such title as~ under our la\vs~ is possessed by a husband, 
by a wife or widow, should operate to deprive a wife or wid-
ow of the right in real property the law itself set up for her~ 
Appellant suggests the widow is taking an inconsistent 
position claiming through the deeds to get the entire amount 
of the property whereas she would~ under the laws of sue ... 
cessiont be entitled to but one-third or one-half of the hus-
band ~s property; yet for inheritance tax purposes refusing 
to recognize the deeds or gift and attempting to take by 
do\ver + Appellant suggests there is an estoppel. 
It is apparent Appellant misunderstands Respondent's 
position~specially does she not claim through the deeds 
to get the entire amount of the property~ 
Respondent does claim under the deeds all of the right, 
title and interest in the property her husband had a legal 
right to convey~ subject to the inheritance taxes resulting 
thereon. Respondent does claim under the dower statute all 
of the right~ title and interest in the property such statute 
affords her, together with all of the emoluments thereoft 
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including the right to freedom from inheritance taxes on 
the property so hers under the statute. There is no more 
overlapping or inconsistency in these claims than there is in 
the simple equation of % plus Va equals 3,./3. 
There is no attempt to acquiesce in and enjoy the bene. 
fits of a transaction and at the same time reject the accom· 
panying burdens, as is specific ally stated in 19 Am. Jur. 
Estoppel) Sec. 21 ~ nor to claim under an instrument without 
confirming it as further provided in said citation. We~ there-
fore~ fail to see an estoppel in this case. 
A dower interest is an interest in real property~ In this 
case the wid ow did not join in the conveyance to herseH 
(R~ 7 ~ 8~ and 9). The deeds were delivered by the grantor to 
his son for recording subsequent to the death of the grantor, 
and pursuant thereto such deeds were recorded (R. 3 ~ 7 ,8~ 
and 9). 
Has the widow made any relinquishment of her dower 
rights? The Statute of frauds too has applicability in the de-
termination of this question. 
4='25-5 .. 1. Estate or interest in real property.-No 
estate or interest in real property~ other than leases 
for a term not exceeding one year~ nor any trust ot 
power over or cone erning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, grantedt 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by 
act or opration of law~ or by deed or conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating~ granting~ 
assigning~ surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.'~ 
(Emphasis added.) 
It seems apparent to the writer that the decedent owned 
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real properties in his lifetime; made conveyances to his wife:t 
as the facts disclose; died; his 'Wife survived; his son record-
ed the deeds; and his wife has made no relinquishment of 
dower rights; nor have her rights been deprived her by act 
or operation of law. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged that this Honorable Court deter· 
mine the question submitted in this appeal, and having done 
so, affirm the Judgment and Decree of the lower court. 
Respectfully submittedt 
DAVID K. HOLTHER, 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Elfreda A~ Malan. 
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